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Information is a crucial currency for living organisms as it allows them to
adjust their behaviour to environmental fluctuations. Thus, natural selection
should have favoured the capacity of collecting information from different
sources, including social interactions whereby individuals could quickly
gain reliable information. However, such conditions may also favour the
gathering of potentially detrimental information, such as false or misinter-
preted accounts of environmental and social phenomena such as rumours,
whichmay spread via informational cascades.We applied ecological and evol-
utionary principles to investigate how the propagation of social information at
a populational level affects the propensity to assimilate it, here defined as the
gullibilty. Our results show that the evolution of an individual’s susceptibility
to assimilate information strongly depends on eco-evolutionary feedbacks, in
particular when both useful and detrimental information circulate.We discuss
our results regarding the different information transmission mechanisms
involved with particular attention to specific cases of social learning.1. Introduction
Information is a crucial resource for all living organisms. Unicellular or multi-
cellular, animal or plant, an organism often relies on the gathering, assessment
and assimilation of relevant information about current and future environments.
By reducing uncertainty, information crucially helps individuals to adapt their
behaviour in response to fluctuating ecological and social environments [1].
Ecosystems generate fluxes of visual, auditory and chemical information in the
form of cues (abiotic parameters, such as changes in temperature or luminosity)
and signals (information produced with a certain intention and destined to one
or several receivers [2]). Acquiring and processing information are part of a dyna-
mical process: individuals must assess the cues they perceivewith respect to prior
knowledge (taking into account that some cues may provide contradictory infor-
mation [3]), and if necessary update their knowledge, while taking into account
the information possessed by others [1,4]. Ultimately, we would expect individ-
uals to carefully weigh all options available to them and their potential
consequences in terms of fitness pay-off [5,6].
There are typically twoways to acquire information: frompersonal experience
(for instance by trial-and-error tactics) or from other individuals (by using avail-
able social information). The latter results from social interactions that encompass
a vast array of transmission mechanisms, including, among others, true com-
munication, imitation, developmental imprinting and teaching [7]. Whether it
is communicated intentionally or inadvertently, social information is of a parti-
cular importance in decision-making because it facilitates individuals to solve a
given life-history problem by observing the behaviour of fellow beings faced
with a similar situation [8,9]. Not only does it generally reduce the costs of
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as a more reliable and faster way of gaining information [8].
A large body of work has shown that social transmission
of information is a widespread phenomenon in the animal
kingdom, used in a variety of situations. Among the most
obvious examples is, of course, the human species in which
social information plays a crucial role in the everyday life
context, be it decision-making, problem-solving, assessing
competitors and mate choosiness [10]. Many examples are
also well-documented in other species, for instance in foraging
contexts (e.g. individuals monitoring others probing success of
resource quality and breeding patches [11]), sexual selection
(e.g. mate choice, influenced from the exposure of watching
mating interactions of others [12]) and the learning of new
behavioural skills (e.g. social learning in offspring [13]).
Like any type of biological information, social information
should always allow individuals to increase their fitness,
provided that it is well interpreted and used optimally [14].
However, in social species, socially acquired information
comes from the behavioural decisions of other individuals
rather than the cues on which these decisions are based. More-
over, individuals may also be subject to social manipulation
[15,16]. Thus, the quantity of social information may be poor
and can lead to sub-optimal decisions and even wrong (and
hence maladaptive) decision-making behaviour. In turn, this
can induce informational cascades whereby potentially mal-
adaptive social information propagates inside a population
[17]. Owing to the scarcity of information and situational
uncertainty, information is passed on between individuals
who often lack the means to check it. In this context, particular
types of social information such as rumours offer an interesting
example. They can be defined as unconfirmed, neither com-
pletely true or false, consisting of social information that is
more or less public, and that it usually propagates rapidly
over a short temporal window [18].
Susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) models of epi-
demiology have been adapted to described rumours
propagation since [19,20]. In analogy with epidemiology of
infectious diseases, the population is subdivided into three
groups: those who are unaware of the rumour (ignorants),
those who spread the rumour (spreaders) and those who are
aware of the rumour but do not spread it (stiflers). Although
subsequent studies retained this approach, these models
were too simplistic and only considered homogenously
mixed population with no social structure. As then, numerous
theoretical models incorporated spatial structure using net-
work theory [21,22], considered new subclasses (such as
‘hibernators’ [22]) or various individual’s properties (such as
denial and skepticism [23]; rememberingmechanisms [24]; for-
getting mechanisms [25]). Such studies have proven useful in
understanding overall patterns of propagation and diffusion
behaviour within a structured population and specific net-
works. However, although considerable research has been
dedicated to the topic of rumours, to our knowledge, it has
received scant attention from an evolutionary perspective,
especially when one is interested in the evolution of collecting
social information.
In this context, host–parasite models could constitute
a similar starting point, as these may provide guidelines
and inspiration on how to model the dynamical process of
the spread of different information of uncertain value at the
population level. Epidemiology allows insightful views on
how a given state (here, being informed) spreads, behavesand potentially competes with other states within a host
population. From these different informational states, the
adaptive dynamics framework allows us to assess fitness
consequences and evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) of col-
lecting rumours [26], with and without social structure in the
form of a contact network [27]. By applying the methods of
eco-evolutionary dynamics to study the evolution of social
information use, we formalized and explored a simple model
to study the following questions: (i) what are the conditions
for the coexistence of different rumours, given their specific
characteristics (concerning dissemination, loss and interaction
with other rumours) within a population? (ii) how does the
capacity to collect rumours evolve over time, i.e. how can we
link the dynamics of the informational state of individuals
(which may change over time through communication and
loss) to their fitness? and (iii) how does the outcome depend
on eco-evolutionary feedbacks?
To address these questions, we will develop and analyse a
series of simple models that track the population dynamics
and its evolutionary consequences through what we define
as the ‘informational state’ of individuals. Rumour propa-
gation is an obvious example where such states evolve (as
aforementioned for SIR models in humans), but social
‘scrounging’ (inferring the informational state of conspecifics
by observing their behaviour) is another and perhaps more
general one in nature [8,17].2. Theory, methods and results
(a) Introducing the epidemiological model
Consider a fixed population of N individuals in which two
distinct rumours (hereafter also termed information) circu-
late. We denote individuals that have received rumour 1 or
2, respectively, I1 and I2, and I1,2 if they have received both.
Naive individuals are denoted S and we will assume that
all individuals are born naive.
Individuals communicate the information they possess to
conspecifics with given probabilities a1 and a2, respectively,
for I1 and I2 and we assume that these probabilities are fixed.
We also assume that the information is not modified when
passed on between individuals (i.e. it is perfectly replicated).
Note that individuals pass on information only if they are in
close contact either through observation (i.e. imitation) or
by true communication (i.e. with the intention to provide infor-
mation to conspecifics). There is no broadcasting of information.
The probability per unit time of acquiring information i is
proportional to the density of i-spreading individuals:
li ¼ ai(Ii þ I1,2):
In epidemiological contexts (where parasites are spreading
instead of rumours), this is called the ‘force’ of infection. For
lackof amore appropriate term,wewill calllihere the ‘pressure’
of i-information. For simplicity, we assume that individuals
carrying both types of information transmit them as quickly as
individuals carrying one type of information only.
Individuals can also forget the information they possess
with given probabilities per unit of time b1 and b2, respect-
ively, for I1 and I2. Individuals may assess the information
not reliable or irrelevant in regards to social interactions,
survival or reproduction, all of these latter processes contri-
buting to the forgetting of information. We assume that
individuals do not acquire or forget both units of information
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conversely). Thus, I1,2 individuals will communicate both
rumours but independently (that is, not both at the same
time to the same individual).
We further assume that individuals have a characteristic
probability to assimilate received information, regardless of
the information it already possesses, given the parameter d.
This probability directly refers to the susceptibility of
assimilating social information. For instance, if d ¼ 0,
individuals are completely naive and do not assimilate infor-
mation; if d ¼ 1 they will retain all information they receive.
Thus, d corresponds to the notion of ‘gullibility’ as defined
by Krakauer & Pagel [28]. To many people, ‘naive’ and ‘gul-
lible’ are synonyms, but as we define these terms, ‘naive’
corresponds with a state while ‘gullibility’ is associated
with transitions (see the electronic supplementary material,
appendix S1 for a representation of the states’ transitions).
‘Gullibility’ may be referred to a general tendency to use
social information as social systems evolve in complexity
(increased number of interactions between conspecifics).
In the first part of our analysis, we keep the total population
density N constant so that
S ¼ N  I1  I2  I1,2:
The dynamics of the system over time is thus fully
described by the following differential equations:
dI1
dt
¼ dSl1 þ b2I1;2  b1I1  dI1l2;
dI2
dt
¼ dSl2 þ b1I1;2  b2I2  dI2l1;
and
dI1;2
dt
¼ dI1l2 þ dI2l1  ðb1 þ b2ÞI1;2
after substitution of the conservation law defined above.
(b) The conditions for the coexistence of rumours
We will start by considering the conditions for invasion
of the two types of rumour and the conditions for coexis-
tence. To study the dynamics of a rumour it is useful to
consider the dynamics of the total density of individuals
that carries it, I^i ¼ Ii þ I1,2. The dynamics of I^2 turns out to
be given by
dI^2
dt
¼ d(Sþ I1)l2  b2(I2 þ I1,2),
as l2 ¼ a2 I^2, and Sþ I1 ¼ N  I2 can be written as
dI^2
dt
¼ (a2d(N þ I^2) b2)^I2
(and an equivalent equation can be derived for rumour 1).
The fact that the dynamics of rumour 2 does not depend
on the presence of rumour 1 implies that the two rumours
circulate fully independently in the population. The condition
for invasion of rumour 2 is, therefore, simply
a2dN
b2
. 1,
and the equivalent condition holds for the invasion of
rumour 1. Note that the simple condition for coexistence
would not result if we would allow different rumours to inter-
act within individuals. For instance, the rate of dissemination
could depend on whether the ‘host’ has acquired other
rumours. A rumour couldmake its ‘host’ forget other rumoursand it could make its ‘hosts’ more or less gullible. These are
very interesting cases to study, but fall outside of the scope of
this study.
Inspection of the invasion condition for a rumour
shows that it may be selected to try to increase its rate of
dissemination a, for instance by attracting attention. But of
course, it could also try to become more persistent in a
given individual by reducing its rate of loss b. Finally, and
significantly, a rumour may try to reduce the probability
that its individual acquire new ones by manipulating d.
As in the evolution of parasite virulence, the eventual out-
come will depend on the constraints that delimit the a, b
and d parameters.
The coexistence of different types of information may be
applicable to general situations of social learning, whereby
new information spreads independently of other informa-
tion. For instance, the discovery of a new type of edible
food is unlikely to interfere with information about the
presence of predators, how to deal with a particular habitat
or the presence of a new cultural item. The resulting informa-
tional cascades can be propagated through observation or
true communication [29]. However, what happens if two
rumours have different fitness outcomes has not been
considered yet. To study the evolutionary consequences,
we will always ensure that both rumours can persist in
the population.3. Information and individual fitness
(a) Informational states
In this section, we ask ourselves how, given the potential
diversity of rumours circulating in the population, an indi-
vidual should increase or decrease its readiness to
assimilate them. Of course, the answer is clear if all infor-
mation has a beneficial effect or all information has a
detrimental effect, but what an individual should do in the
presence of rumours of potentially contrasting effects
(e.g. some of them are true and useful, others are not) is
less obvious.
The diversity of rumours causes individuals to be in differ-
ent informational states, potentially affecting differently their
fitness. We suppose that an individual is characterized by its
‘gullibility’ d, the probability that it assimilates a rumour
when presented with it. The question then becomes what is
the evolutionarily stable value d*. To study this question, we
extended the system such that we have a resident population
from which mutants can arise and in turn assimilate the infor-
mation that circulates, according to the methodology of
adaptive dynamics [26].
We will, therefore, assume that the resident population is
at a stable equilibrium such that the information pressures are
at equilibria, indicated by the asterisk and given by
li ¼ ai(Ii þ I1,2),
with the resident densities at equilibria indicated by the
overbars.
Now mutants may arise with their own properties of
assimilating information (indicated by the label ‘mut’). We
will denote probabilities of the mutants being in particular
states aspS (the probability of being naive),p1 (having received
rumour 1), p2 (having received rumour 2) and p1,2 (having
received both rumours). The changes of these probabilities
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mation are given by
dpS
dt
¼ ðdmutl1 þ dmutl2Þps þ b1p1 þ b2p2;
dp1
dt
¼ dmutl1ps þ b2p1;2  b1p1  dmutl2p1;
dp2
dt
¼ dmutl2ps þ b1p1;2  b2p2  dmutl1p2;
and
dp1;2
dt
¼ dmutl2p1 þ dmutl1p2  ðb1 þ b2Þp1;2:
This system describes all transition processes and
corresponds to a standard continuous Markov chain. The equi-
librium probability distribution of the mutants’ states can
be easily solved (see the electronic supplementary material,
appendix S2 for the solution) and is given by
pS
p1
p2
p12
0
BB@
1
CCA ¼
1
D
b1b2
b2d
mutl1
b1d
mutl2
(dmut)2l1l

2
0
BB@
1
CCA,
where D ¼ (b1 þ dmutl*1)(b2 þ dmutl*2).
If being in state i corresponds with rate of reproduction
wi, the expected fitness of a mutant will be given by
wmut ¼ wSpS þ w1p1 þ w2p2 þ w12p12,
which is just the expectation of wi given fixed probabilities pi.
A more complicated expression would result if information
affected survival instead of reproduction, but for the sake
of simplicity we do not consider this case here.
We assume that an individual cannot assess the fitness
value of a rumour it acquires (i.e. it cannot have a discrimina-
tive, or filtering, strategy such that dmut1 =d
mut
2 ). The question
then is which is the best strategy, avoiding rumours altogether
(dmut ¼ 0), acquire all rumours as quickly as possible (dmut ¼ 1),
or adopt some optimal intermediate value?We can easily calcu-
late the mutant’s state probabilities at equilibrium and obtain
the following expression for the mutant’s fitness:
wmut ¼ b1b2wS þ b2d
mutl1w1 þ b1dmutl2w2 þ dmut
2
l1l

2w12
(b1 þ dmutl1)(b2 þ dmutl2)
:
From this equation, we can infer (see the electronic sup-
plementary material, appendix S3) that it pays to have at
least some attention to rumours if
l1Dw1
b1
þ l2Dw2
b2
. 0,
where Dwi ¼ wi 2 wS, so that rumour i is useful if Dwi is posi-
tive, and costly if it is negative (relative to being naive).
Intermediate optima given by the solution of a quadratic
equation (see third equation in the electronic supplementary
material, appendix S3) are possible if at least one of Dw1, Dw2
and Dw12 is negative.
Given these results, three scenarios are possible. If all
information that circulates (concerning edible food, the
presence of new a predator or a new cultural item) is
fitness-enhancing, then individuals are selected to being
fully gullible. If all information is fitness-decreasing, individ-
uals will obviously evolve to be fully skeptical. The third,
more interesting scenario is when some information is
fitness-enhancing whereas others are fitness-decreasing.
Then, the intermediate gullibity may be selected which, aswe will show, will result in a sensitive eco-evolutionary feed-
back. Cases with mixed-effect information are likely to be
quite general. A well-known example is that of Batesian
mimicry, where a conspicuous pattern may either convey
useful information (allowing avoidance of a bad experience)
or misleading information (leading to a missed meal) [30].
Another example is when individuals are confronted with
both deceptive and honest individuals in complex social sys-
tems (although one individual can switch between these two
forms of behaviour) and is well documented in primates [31].
Cases involving individuals attracted to feeding conspecifics
where patches deplete rapidly fail to learn habitat quality,
leading to aggregation in poor patches (in addition to travel
costs), leading to severe populational consequences [32]. In
particular, for the more general scenario where it is not
immediately obvious to a user whether the information is
useful or detrimental, we have to incorporate the feedbacks
that result when information circulates through a population.(b) The evolution of assimilating information
In this section, we will carry out an adaptive dynamics
analysis of the gullibility of individuals (their propensity to
assimilate the rumours they are confronted with) and its
effects on the population level, represented by d in our
model. We consider two strategies (a resident strategy, indi-
cated by the label ‘res’, which dominates the population
and a rare mutant strategy indicated by the label ‘mut’)
which differ in the likelihood to assimilate information
(dmut=dres). The value of the mutant trait determines its
invasion fitness, which tells us if it can invade or will go
extinct. The goal in adaptive dynamics is to determine what
happens if the resident population(s) generates new mutants
that may also have an effect on the state of the system. In
most studies, the simplifying assumption is made that
mutations are so rare that if one does invade, it will replace
the ancient resident before the next mutant comes around.
The goal is then to work out what happens when this
so-called ‘trait-substitution process’ is iterated [26]. When a
resident population resists invasion by all possible mutants,
we have an ESS. Not all ESSs are evolutionary attractors,
however; some ESSs can be evolutionary repellers. So-called
pair-wise invasibility plots (or PIPs, which shows the sign
of the mutant’s invasion fitness in the dmut  dres plane) can
show that under certain conditions a population that is not
exactly at the ESS, the process of repeated invasions will
lead the population away from the ESS instead of being
pulled towards it.
Here, we will start with our system dominated by a resi-
dent population that is at equilibrium. As the system
described in the first section comprises three nonlinear
equations, numerical solutions are needed to estimate the
equilibria of the resident (i.e. I1,I2,I12). Different equilibria
are possible but we are typically looking at the one where
both rumours are present (i.e. I1,I2,I12 . 0), which will be
used to calculate the information pressures l*1 and l
*
2 at equi-
libria. What is important to remember here is that those
equilibria are entirely determined by the current value of dres.
Now, we can determine the fitness of the mutants using
the equation in the previous section, which yields
wmut(dmut,dres) ¼ b1b2wS þ b2d
mutl1w1 þ b1dmutl2w2 þ dmut
2
l1l

2w12
(b1 þ dmutl1)(b2 þ dmutl2)
,
1.0
0.8
0.4
dmut
d res
d*
d*
0.2
0 0.2
+
+
–
–
0.80.4 1.0
Figure 1. A pairwise invasibility plot of information assimilation strategies.
Each of the drawn lines (grey lines) is a fitness contour and circumscribe
the areas where the fitness of the mutant is positive (grey-shaded area)
and negative (white area). The arrows represent the iteration of invasion
of successive mutants as represented in the fitness landscapes. For instance,
a new mutant appears with a susceptibility value that confers positive fitness
(vertical arrow), consequently invading the system in which all individuals
will have the same trait value (horizontal arrow). This process continues
until the system reaches the ESS, denoted d*(here d*  0.6).
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determined by the resident dres where the fitness of the
resident is given by wres(dres) ¼ wmut(dres, dres).
According to the PIP shown in figure 1 there is a single
ESS which is evolutionary convergent (i.e. the singularity
is an evolutionary attractor), meaning that the susceptibi-
lity of individuals to assimilate information slowly but
inevitably evolves towards the value d*. When the parameters
change the value of d* changes, but the structure of the PIP
remains the same, we have not found examples of other
evolutionary outcomes.
The most important conclusion to draw here is that the
simultaneous coexistence of beneficial and detrimental infor-
mation may favour an intermediate information use strategy
(other than full ignorance or maximum gullibility) which
depends on the relative information pressures and thus on
the ecology of the population. In the next section, we will see
if structured populations affect the evolution of gullibility.4. Rumour dynamics in structured populations
By fixing population density and by assuming that rumours are
passed on between random individuals, we make quite strong
assumptions about the effect of information on population
dynamics. In this section, we will relax these assumptions
to explore the interaction between rumours and population
structure and dynamics.
We assume that individuals live on a lattice of sites and
interact only with their nearest neighbours. That is, both repro-
duction (into an empty neighbouring site) and communication
(transmission to a neighbour) are local processes. This set-up
leads to an (asynchronous) probabilistic cellular automaton,
forwhich a suite of numerical and analyticalmethods are avail-
able. Here, wewill just outline howwe construct and analyse a
cellular automaton version of the model that we considered
so far; for more information about the technical details we
refer to [33,34].Cellular automata are defined in terms of a lattice of sites
(typically laid out in a two-dimensional grid) and a set of
events that change the state of the lattice. In our case, the
events represent reproduction (into neighbouring sites), mor-
tality and the transfer of information between neighbours
(which changes the state of an individual as discussed before).
We could incorporatemovement or dispersal too butwill refrain
fromdoing so to avoid addingmore parameters to consider (see
the electronic supplementary material, appendix S5 for more
informationonhowto construct andanalyse this type ofmodel).
Quite arbitrarily, we will assume here that information has
no effect on reproduction (so r(xS) ¼ r(x1) ¼ r(x2) ¼ r(x12) ¼ r0)
but may affect survival such that having the first rumour helps
individuals to survive (d(x1), d0 where d(xS) ¼ d0), whereas
the second rumour has no other effect than neutralizing the
beneficial effect in mixed-informed individuals (similar results
occur if the second rumour has a slightly deleterious effect).
The helpful information has a lower transmission rate than
the detrimental information (a1, a2); we will further assume
that both rumours are forgotten with the same rate (b1 ¼ b2).
The rumours circulating in the populationmay have strong
effects on its dynamics: when helpful information is abundant,
the population grows, until detrimental information becomes
prevalent and the population decreases again (in the simu-
lation, the detrimental information spreads faster but has no
beneficial effect, figure 2a). Because reproduction is local, indi-
viduals will produce clustered distributions, and the dynamics
of the rumour is even stronger clustered as information only
spreadswithin these clusters (figure 2b). Through the beneficial
effects, clusters dominated by useful rumourswill expand until
they are invaded by detrimental rumours. Because detrimental
rumours convey no benefit, they tend to overexploit the clus-
ters they reside in, which stop growing and may even die out.
Probabilistic cellular automata and related individual-
based models can be easily used to study the ecological
dynamics of such systems, but they are less appropriate to
study evolutionary dynamics. The most important difficulty
is that for every resident system the fitness of an entire set of
mutants needs to be calculated, which essentially squares the
computing time. To carry out an evolutionary analysis, we
used a correlation dynamics approach [33,34]: this approxi-
mation models the dynamics of the set of spatial correlations
that allows assessment of the effects of spatial structure to a
first approximation and can be used to apply the basicmethod-
ology of adaptive dynamics, that is, first determine the
dynamics of a resident strategy and then assess the invasion fit-
ness of the set of mutants. Figure 3 shows a pairwise
invasibility plot for a non-spatial (a) and a spatial (b) version
of the model, of susceptibility to information (d) when there
is useful and detrimental rumours.
For this set of parameters, spatial structure favours a
higher level of susceptibility to information (d  0.7) than
the ESS for non-spatial models (d  0.5). Increased suscepti-
bility is favoured under those conditions because cluster
structure segregates the information types, allowing individ-
uals to benefit from useful rumours while protecting them
from detrimental ones. In other words, the spatial segre-
gation allows clusters of related individuals [33] to benefit
from the useful information. Thus, social information may
interact with kin selection.
These intermediate levels of susceptibility result from
global but also local population-dynamical feedbacks and
are thus very sensitive to the spatial ecology of the
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
50 100 150 200 250 300
t = 300
(b)(a)
Figure 2. Probabilistic cellular automaton simulation of the resident system. (a) Global density (black) and the density of the useful rumours (red triangles)
and detrimental rumours (blue inverted triangles). (b) A spatial snapshot at t ¼ 300; purple dots indicate individuals of both information units. Parameter
values: a1 ¼ 10, a2 ¼ 12, b1 ¼ b2 ¼ 1, d ¼ 1, r0 ¼ 0.15, d0 ¼ d2 ¼ d12 ¼ 0.1, d1 ¼ d0/10 (individuals of exclusively useful information live 10 times
as long); the (toroidal) lattice has 10 000 sites in a triangular pattern so that every site has six neighbours. Initially, the lattice is seeded with a proportion
of 12 d0/r0 individuals in a random distribution, of which a proportion of 0.001 carries rumour 1. The detrimental information arises through misunderstanding
events, which occur once every 104 transmissions.
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Figure 3. Pairwise invasibility plot of (a) a dynamical but non-spatial (mean-field) version and (b) a correlation dynamics version of the model. Parameters as in
figure 2. Blue circles indicate d values for which both rumours go extinct and hence d is neutral; the grey circles indicate the value of invasion fitness: black to grey
implies positive fitness, grey to white implies negative fitness. Every circle shows the average rate of increase of a mutant over t [ [285, 300] (a time interval
chosen such that the resident has sufficiently converged to its equilibrium) for those parameter combinations where information gets transmitted by the resident
population (when not, the circles are coloured in blue).
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the effects of the different rumours circulating in the popu-
lation: if detrimental information is more harmful, lower
values of d are favoured. Any modification of the model is
likely to have an effect on the end result, which implies
that we may not fully understand the evolution of infor-
mation use without taking into consideration its entire
ecological setting.5. Discussion
The fitness of individuals will often depend on their informa-
tional state, or, more explicitly, on what knowledge they have
about the actual state of their environment. Much of this
information is, of course, obtained either genetically orindividually (through experience) but often some of it is
obtained socially, either just by observing others or actively
through communication. While some of the social information
may indeed convey useful knowledge, some of it is of no use
(or even detrimental) to individuals but spread nevertheless.
When individuals have no way of verifying rumours, they can
only adopt an overall strategy of assimilating rumours, that is,
have a certain level of ‘gullibility’. Here, we show that even in
the absence of eco-evolutionary feedbacks, natural selection
may select an intermediate level of gullibility when both
useful and costly rumours circulate. However, when infor-
mation actually does have an effect on individual fitness,
feedbacksmayarise that cause the population to evolve towards
an entirely different level of information use. Would the popu-
lation as a whole be very skeptical, information (including
detrimental information) will not spread easily. Under those
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from advantageous information. This benefit will cause the
population to increase in density, and with it, potential for
rumours to circulate, which favours the invasion of detrimental
information. Thus, the use of social information is favoured to a
certain extent. However, if the assimilation rate increases
beyond the ESS value, detrimental information will spread too
and more skeptical assimilation strategies will be favoured.
This feedback is likely to depend on every detail of the popu-
lation’s structure and dynamics, as well as the particular
mechanisms of information transfer.
Our model is based on three critical assumptions which
limit its applicability: (i) transmission is done through pairwise
contact, (ii) information is not checked, and (iii) information
does not change in long transmission chains. Regarding the
first assumption, our model does not include broadcasting of
information,which is nevertheless quite common. For instance,
alarm calls signalling the presence of a predator is generally
public information transferred simultaneously to many
individuals. Also, observational or imitationmechanisms typi-
cally involve several observers, such as when individuals
scrounge for food or learn specific behaviours [35]. However,
even in our model, information spreads swiftly in connected
groups so this limitation is not so serious. The second assump-
tion (i.e. that individuals have nowayof checking the value of a
rumour) calls for careful attention in the results presented in
§§3 and 4. Sometimes an individual that imitates a conspecific
can immediately check the information value. For instance, an
individual observing a conspecific feeding or performing a
particular behaviour can immediately check the value of
the information by testing it. However, a few informational
cascades have been reported. For instance, in laboratory
conditions, guppies continued to use social maladaptive infor-
mation (i.e. when seeking feeding patches) spread by founding
members, evenwhen other beneficial informationwas still pre-
sent (i.e. less costly information to another feeding route) [36].
In nature, this can occur when individuals are attracted to feed-
ing conspecifics and it can have important consequences in
spatial distribution and population dynamics, especially
when considering various quality patches that can deplete
rapidly [32]. The sudden departure of a few individuals from
a flock without the absence of a predator in avian collective
movements might be another example [37], although such
cases involve ephemeral information (e.g. spreading over
short temporal window) and must probably be treated separ-
ately. Finally, this assumption also implies that individuals
have no previous experience or pre-existing knowledge to
deal with the new information they are confronted with,
which needs to be accounted for in real ecological and social
settings. Finally, our third assumption also needs particular
attention. Long transmission chains are possible in the afore-
mentioned examples. In culture, while there are some cases
of animal traditions that seem to be rather stable over long
transmission chains [38,39], the vast majority of studies of
social learning are concerned with single transmissions
only. Of course, this does not mean that it is always like
this in nature. Transmission chain studies are rather scarce
and often limited in other ways owing to the difficulty of
studying such aspects in nature [40]. However, animal tra-
ditions in the wild where stable transmission over many
generations have been well recorded (including humans)
[41], and in this sense our results may be applied to cultural
transmission.Our model is very simple and thus does not apply to
many cases sensu stricto, which calls for careful examination
to results presented here when confronted to cases of social
transmission of information in nature. However, modelling
the spread of rumours using an epidemiological structure
allows a more general view on the propagation of infor-
mation of uncertain fitness value. This leaves a few points
to be discussed regarding the modelling of information
spreading as parasites within informational cascades.
For instance, aswe have shown, structure is likely to impact
the evolution of assimilating information. As in the epidemiol-
ogy of infectious diseases, rumour spreading patterns are
strongly influenced by the structure of social networks [42].
For instance, when an individual tries to pass on a rumour to
a close contact it may be that this individual already received
it through another route (for instance, via a common contact).
This obviously applies to humans but it is also observed in
animal species with pronounced social organizations [43].
Indeed, individuals typically do not interact randomly with
each other, but according to some social structure involving
relatives or neighbours. Not only does this affect the trans-
mission patterns (i.e. to whom information is transferred),
but also the speed at which it propagates through the popu-
lation. The model we considered assumes interactions among
neighbours that occupy sites on a regular lattice, but other
network topologies are possible, and likely to have effects
[21,22]. Moreover, just as in epidemiology the modes of trans-
mission or the levels of contact may differ between diseases
[44], rumour diffusionmaydepend on their specific informational
content. For instance, rumours pertaining to local political events
in human societies seem to spread more swiftly and widely than
information concerninghow todealwith climate change even if in
the long run the latter is probably more important.
Some differences between information and parasites also
need to be considered. Perhaps the most important one is that
a given rumour may not induce the same, characteristic infor-
mational state in every host and thus induce different effects
and spreading modes. Whereas parasites are clear aetiological
agents, precisely what is transmitted during the transfer of a
rumour is less clear. Moreover, it is widely assumed that para-
site evolution is limited by physiological constraints linking
transmission rate and virulence [45]; the constraints, if any,
that delimit the spreading capacity of rumours are essentially
unknown. The kind of susceptible–infected–susceptible (SIS)
(and SIR) models of rumour propagation that we considered
may therefore not give the full picture. Somehow or other,
models should incorporate the fact that information is a product
of cognitive processes rather than simple and blind replication
when transmitted by contact. To study their propagation, one
needs to consider all events potentially occurring along a cogni-
tive chain of transmission [46], especially when studying
information cascades. The representation of the transmitted
information probably differs widely among individuals and
its content may be altered, potentially changing at every trans-
mission step. To take into account such aspects, one can
implement a ‘mutation rate’ (resulting from either accidentally
passing on wrong information or misinterpreting received
information) in the model. This aspect could be particularly
important in rumours because they are subject to ‘chinesewhis-
pers’ style modification along the way. As this may give rise to
the transmission of a whole cloud of different versions of the
rumour, Claidie`re and Sperber [40] argue that we need to
know the properties of such clouds and how they are affected
rspb.royalsocietypublish
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properties may also need to be considered, as previously
done in SIR and SIS models of rumours, such as denial and
skepticism, remembering, forgetting, refutation and the pres-
ence of external forces acting upon diffusion behaviours,
and may shed light on how information propagates and how
individuals can act upon information diffusion [23–25].
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